

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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## TO CORRESPONDENTS,

IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Botley, near Southampton, 20th May, 1815.

I have, within these few days, had tendered to me, through the *Post*, a small parcel from America, with "*newspapers*" written on it. This parcel had, as appears by the *Post-mark*, been sent from *Liverpool* to *London*, and from *London* to *Botley*. The charge on it was *nine shillings and six-pence sterling*; that is to say, however, in our paper money, being about, at this time, *a dollar and a half*. I did not take the parcel, of course, much as I wished to see its contents. From this account, it will be perceived, that, unless parcels of newspapers, coming from America, be actually conveyed *by the bearer of them* either to me at *Botley* (which can seldom happen), or to *London*, the object in sending them must be defeated; for, a file of daily papers, for only one month, sent to me by post from any out-port, would cost, at least, the price of a good large fat hog. I remember one parcel, which came to me, charged with *nine pounds some odd shillings of postage*, which is now the price of a hog of seventeen score weight.—As I am very desirous to receive, frequently, papers from America, and as the papers in that country are not, as ours are, loaded with a tax equal to more than one half of their retail price, I will point out the manner in which they may be sent to me.—The parcel should be addressed to me by name, "*to the care of the Publisher of Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, London.*" But, it ought, if the vessel go to *London*, to be carried by the master, or mate, or by some careful person; and, if the vessel arrive at some out-port, the parcel, with the same direction on it, should be carried to some office, whence a *London Coach* departs. There it should be delivered, and the bearer should see it *booked*, as we call it.—By these means American papers will reach me with very little trouble, and at an expence of which I should think nothing.—All single letters from America

may be addressed to me at *Botley*, near *Southampton*, and be put, at once, into any post-office in this country.—The hirelings, who conduct nine-tenths of the newspapers in *London*, have all possible facilities in receiving American newspapers. But, they publish from them that only which suits their purpose. Their object is to mislead the people here; or, to keep them in the dark; and, they cull out every passage calculated to answer this end. Besides, there are very few papers (the *National Intelligencer* excepted), which are sent to *England*, except the papers called *Federal*. The persons who send these papers, if not *English* by birth, are *English* by connection. Thus we see only one side of the picture; and hence it was, that malignant and beastly as is the Editor of our *Times* newspaper, for instance, the fellow really might be deceived himself by the cookoo clamour of the Aristocratical American newspapers; but, hence, though I could get a sight of none but the same sort of papers, *I was not deceived*, because I had had that experience, which enabled me to put a proper value upon what I saw in these papers.—It is of great consequence to the cause of truth and freedom, that the Republican papers should come to us from America, and that other Republican works should also reach us; for, it is from this Island that opinions and facts go forth to produce impression on the mind of the world. Bound up as our press is, we, by one means or another, contrive to get a great deal into circulation. We are nearer the grand scenes of action than you are; and, if you wish your principles and your example to have their due and speedy effect, we must be the principal vehicle of them.—Some one at *Philadelphia* has recently sent me a parcel of American papers, received at *Philadelphia* from other places, from which I perceive, that my *Letters to Lord Liverpool* have been republished in all parts of the Republic, from *Boston* to *Savannah*, from *Philadelphia* to *Pittsburgh*. Flattering as this is to my self-love, it is much more gratifying to me as a proof of the powers of the press, and

as the foundation of a rational hope, that the day is not distant, when tyranny, wherever it may exist, will fall beneath those powers.—Letter VI. to the Earl of Liverpool, I wrote, I remember, in a room in a farm-house, one morning when I was detained by rain. I might have thought it; but, certainly I had not then the most distant idea, that what I was then writing, would so quickly come back to me, in another print, after having been read on the banks of the Ohio and those of the Mississippi.—This single fact; the sight of only one such print, is to me more than a compensation for all that I have suffered in the cause of Truth and Freedom. But, it is of far greater importance as a stimulant to future exertion, and as suggesting additional care in planning and executing.—But, why should not the friends of Freedom co-operate? We see how firmly bound together its enemies are; how they, for the furtherance of their grand object, mutually sacrifice all their prejudices and even their petty conflicting interests. You have heard the Saints of Hertford rejoice at the restoration of the Pope. The Holy Father has embraced the Dey of Algiers, who calls him a Christian Dog.—Why should not we aid each other? You are better off than we are. You have free presses in every sea-port; your sea-ports are numerous; your masters of vessels have a direct communication with you; you can easily come at all that we publish. While your continent, and all its presses and literary productions, are shut from us by hundreds of obstacles of which you have no idea, our enemies have their regular correspondences, their communications always open; they know here all that is passing in your country; while we are wholly in the dark; while we are deprived of the use of all those powerful weapons, which your unrestrained press would put into our hands.—I hope that these considerations will be sufficient to induce some one of you, at least, to forward to me, in the manner above pointed out, such papers and other publications, as are likely to be of benefit to the cause of Truth and Freedom, and of which you can want no assurance of my will, at any rate, to make the best possible use.—America now begins to make a great figure in the world; but, her example, which, if made universally known, would be of more, might; than her military or naval

power is, from the causes above stated, of comparatively little service.—I take this opportunity of expressing my best thanks to MR. MATHEW CAREY, of Philadelphia, for a very excellent pamphlet, which he has had the goodness to send me, entitled, “*A Calm Address to the People of the Eastern States, on the Subject of the Representation of Slaves; the Representation in the Senate; and the Illegality to Commerce, ascribed to the Southern States.*”—I should be obliged to some one to send me any work, or works, giving an account of the *Expenses of the Government, and State Governments of America*; also of her shipping, commerce, debts, taxes, &c. &c. And, if Mr. CAREY, or some other person equally capable, would spend a few hours in giving me an account of the prices of provisions and labour, I should deem it a particular favour. These may have changed since I left America.

WM. COBBETT.


P. S. Since writing the above, I have (22d May) received, from some friend in Philadelphia, a small file of *Aurora*, containing the “EXPOSITION of the CAUSES and CHARACTER of the War.” This paper, it appears, is official, and was ready for official promulgation, just at the time when the news of the Peace arrived. I never read so able a paper; never one calculated to produce so great an impression. It is an invaluable document for history; a noble monument of the power of the human mind. If our government have received this paper, and if they will but read it carefully, they will, I am sure, clearly see, that any attempt either to delude, subdue, or check the rise of America, must fail of success.—The paper would fill about four whole Registers, perhaps. But, though I cannot insert it; it will be of great use to me; and I beg the sender to accept of my best thanks.

### LETTER III.

#### TO LORD CASTLEREAGH.

*On the hope of success, in a War against France, which hope is founded on the discontents said to exist in that country.*

MY LORD,—I learn, through the *Texas* newspaper, that these letters of mine, addressed to you, are regularly re-published in France; so that we are in a fair way of





descending to posterity together; a consideration which cannot, of course, fail to encourage me in a continuance of the correspondence. The *Times* recommends to you and your colleagues to put a stop, by the strong hand of power, to writings like mine, in order to prevent their being translated into the French language; and, it does this in the same breath, in which it calls upon this burdened nation to make war upon France, because (as it falsely asserts) she has a tyrant at the head of her government. Such are the writers, who call for war against the French people: such, if you plunge us into war, will be your friends and supporters. I have been told, that, amongst other means, that have been made use of to impede the circulation of the Register, it has been forbidden to be taken in at Army Mess-Rooms and in Ward-Rooms on board of Ships of War. I have never complained of this. But, my Lord, it is very hard, if I am to be permitted to have readers neither abroad nor at home. And, what a cause must that be, which thus wishes to silence by the strong hand of power, all its opponents!

But the subject on which I am now about to address your Lordship, is of a more serious nature. The partisans of war, always blind to the past, appear to be very busily engaged, at this time, in providing for themselves, in advance, every species of disappointment and mortification. They have, as in the case of America, spoken with so much confidence of success; with so much contempt of the adversary; and with so much insolence have they treated him and the whole of the French nation, that, were they not notoriously dead to all sense of shame, they must, in case of failure, commit upon themselves that act, which they would richly merit from the hands of a personage who is about upon their own level in point of occupation. They have now started new game; they have now discovered new ground of hope. They now tell us that France is in a state of commotion, and almost of rebellion, against Napoleon; and, that when once the allied armies begin to move into France, the whole nation will declare for the King.

My Lord, you know this to be false; but, it is no more than merely the second chapter of the delusions practised with regard to America. These same writers told us, that the people of America were hos-

tile to Mr. Madison; that commotions were actually in existence; that the States were upon the eve of dividing; that the President was about to be impeached; and, that we ought not to make peace, till he was deposed and punished. They now tell us of divisions and commotions in France. This is now the lure to entice us into an approbation of war.

And, my Lord, to what do these commotions amount? That there are discontented persons in France; that the Bourbons have partisans amongst ex-nobles and ex-priests, who had begun again to scent the sweets of feudal and ecclesiastical tyranny, is so natural, that it would be miraculous indeed, if there were not troubles in the interior of France. But to what do they amount? We hear of breaches of the peace; we hear of political squabbling; we hear of angry and violent disputes; but where, since the surrender of the Duke of Angoulême, do we hear of any thing like a powerful opposition to the present order of things? We are told, by the *Times* newspaper, that, in one particular instance, cannon has been brought to defend the barracks against the people.

But, my Lord, the very same papers are compelled to confess, that some of the Belgian troops have been actually killed, and others wounded in an effort to go over to the French; that, at Liege, some of the Saxon (now Prussian) soldiers have mutinied, refused to march, and have even attempted acts of violence on the "dear old Blucher," whose whiskers the nasty wretches in London, calling themselves "Ladies," were beastly enough to slobber. Nay, we are told, and that, too, in a proclamation under his own hand, that "he has escaped assassination." We read, in proclamations of the King of Prussia, that to speak in favour of Napoleon is to be punished with the utmost severity. And yet, we are not to be permitted to doubt, that all the nations on the Continent are very hearty in the cause against France; while the most insignificant riot in France we are to look upon as the certain sign of national hostility to the present Government.

If, my Lord, the same criterion were applied to ourselves, what should we say? We have seen, and, I believe, we now see, more than one county in Ireland proclaimed to be in a state of disturbance; we saw, not long ago, counties in England

in a similar state; we have, within these few years, seen a Prime Minister shot in the lobby of the House of Commons, and we saw great numbers of troops brought to London and stationed at no great distance from the place of Mr. Bellingham's execution. The newspapers informed us, that, in the disturbed counties in England, the Judges were guarded by troops of the line. Mr. Bankes is reported, in our newspapers, to have said, not long since, in the House of Commons, that the *military* were sometimes called in to assist in *collecting the taxes* in your country, Ireland. The newspapers have recently told us of two instances, at *Norwich* and at *Lynn*, in England, where the *German troops* were employed to keep the people from committing violences. And, how long, how many weeks is it since troops of the line were brought to prevent *your own house* from being demolished, as those of the Lord Chancellor and the Chief Judge's had been? Nay, were not troops of the line brought to *defend the Parliament House and its Members against the people*; and that, too, only about nine weeks, or ten weeks ago? Is there any thing going on in France equal to these occurrences? And, yet, does any one pretend, that *this government* is, or has been, likely to be overthrown? It is said, from the German papers, that Napoleon takes *precautions against assassination*; and, surely, my Lord, after all that has been promulgated, and even attempted, such precautions cannot be thought wholly unnecessary. But, does this argue, that the *nation* hate him? Our gracious and beloved King went to the Parliament House, and to the Play, of late years, in a *bullet-proof coach*; but, did that fact argue, that he was *hated by his people*?

Every trifle, the words, or pretended words, of any individual, hostile to Napoleon, is greedily caught at and carefully retailed out, by the writers in London. If the press of Paris were to pursue this mode with regard to our government, what would it make of the pithy precepts and sentiments, *written on the walls in and about London*, where any one may easily find words in *praise* of Napoleon, but I will not say what is to be found with regard to *others*. Why, if the walls of Paris were written over in such a way as to Napoleon and his government, we should be told *hourly* to expect to hear of his total destruction.

What *reason* have we, then, to suppose that he is not liked by the people of France? *How came he at Paris*? What but the good wishes, the anxious desires, of the *people*, took him thither? What! are we to be made believe, that he, who went, not only without an army, but almost without companions of any sort, 500 miles through cities and towns fortified, and arrived in the capital without having seen a single hand raised against him; are we to believe, that he is now *hated* by the people of France? And, are we to believe, that Louis, who found not a single man to defend his throne; whose departure was as quiet as if he had been a traveller, lodged at an hotel; who, with all the armies, all the civil authorities, all the treasures of the country, at his command, could not, though he offered immense rewards, obtain the support of any dozen of persons: are we to believe, that the *whole* of the French nation are now for this king?

We are told, that the measures of *police*, which have been adopted in France, prove that Napoleon and his government feel themselves in danger. But, my Lord, let us bear in mind, that, during the war against the French Republic, the *Habeas Corpus Act* was suspended in England for seven years, and that the King and council imprisoned, without trial, for any length of time, any man whom they thought it right to imprison; and, that, in Ireland, *martial law* was in existence at several periods, and for a great length of time. Yet, did any one ever presume to say, that the King and his government were hated by the nation?

We are told also to look at the *French funds*, and to conclude from their price, that the nation are disaffected towards the government. I have shewn; I have *proved*, in my last number, that the French funds are very nearly as high in price as ours are. I have demonstrated this: but, is there no other cause for low price of public funds in France besides that of the *disaffection of the people*? The wonder is, that when a million of men are preparing to invade France, the funds sell for any thing at all. Their being at 60, under such circumstances, proves the *great confidence of the nation*. If we were upon the point of being actually invaded; if we saw only 100 thousand men on board of boats in Bologne harbour ready to sail for England, and had *no defence but a land*



defence, what price do you think *our funds* would be at? Yet, the French see many hundreds of thousands of men armed against them; they know that they have to depend only on their arms for defence; they have no sea to protect them; they know that their country is liable to be invaded every hour: still their funds are nearly at as good a price as ours. What reason, therefore, have we to conclude from the price of the funds, that the French nation are disaffected towards their government? But suppose the funds were to experience in France a greater fall. What have we seen in *England*? Why, we saw the Bank stop payment in 1797, not upon an actual invasion by an army, but merely upon the report of an *invasion being intended*, though we had the whole country armed, and though we had a fleet to defend us of more than 500 ships of war! It was then that the Bank obtained an act of parliament to enable it to *refuse* to pay its own notes in money. From that time it has not paid in money, except in a trifling degree. Since that, laws have been passed to make Bank notes a legal tender, and to prohibit the sale of guineas. Yet, no one has presumed to say that the nation hated the king, and that the people would not fight to defend the country against foreign invasion. Why, therefore, are we to conclude that the French nation hate Napoleon, because the French funds are at a low price?

I think it is clear, then, that we have no good reason to rely for assistance in war, if war should be finally resolved on, on the dislike of the people of France to their government. We must rely, I think *solely* upon the force of our arms and those of our Allies; and, if all the people of France are heartily opposed to us, what prospect have we of *ultimate* success?

On the other hand, how do the people of England feel as to this expected war? There have been petitions, or remonstrances, against it in London, Westminster, Nottingham, and others are preparing. But, where have we seen a meeting to *approve* of the war? For the war of 1793 there were Meetings in abundance. Not one in favour of this war. It is not to be doubted, that the Noblesse and the Clergy and other persons would call Meetings in favour of war, if the *public* feeling was at all for war. Yet not one such Meeting

has been called, except in the town of *Plymouth*, whose address for war is considered in the same light as the *protestant Fishermen* of Newfoundland giving "*the Pope*" as a standing toast. The truth is, that, from one end of the country to the other, the feeling of the people is against war. There is not one man, or woman, out of ten, who does not condemn the presumptuous notice of making war upon France to compel her to change her Chief Magistrate. The case is so plain, that all men understand it. They all say, that we have no business to intermeddle. The question admits of no disguise. For this time even the craft of the prostituted newspapers cannot succeed in deceiving the people. Therefore, if you still resolve to enter upon this war, you find no *voluntary contributions*; you will find very little zeal on the part of the mass of the people; and, if events should compel you to make peace, you will find yourselves in such a situation as no English Ministry were ever before in. You will then feel the real effect of that system of politics begun by Pitt, which system has been pursued from 1792 'till the present hour.

I am, &c. &c. WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 23d May, 1815.

TO

SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, BART.

*On the Pitt System of war against France.*

Botley, 24th May, 1815.

SIR,—Your speech, delivered at the Westminister Meeting, last week, has led to a train of reflections in my mind, which I cannot refrain from laying before the public, and, in order that they may have a better chance of possessing some little merit in the eyes of my readers, I address them immediately to you.

From the out-set of the wars against the Republic of France, you contended, that the result would be *injurious to England*. I will, for the present, leave aside the *real motives* of the wars, and will merely consider *their effects*, as they have hitherto developed themselves. You contended, that we ought to have left the French nation to itself; that, justice and morality and freedom out of the question, the English nation would, in the end, *greatly suffer* in consequence of war against France. That, therefore, wisdom,

sound policy, bade our government remain at peace. The politics of PITT first, and afterwards of LORDS GRENVILLE and GREY, of PERCIVAL and LORD CASTLEREAGH, were directly opposed to yours. They were for war, and (leaving justice out of the question), they said it was *necessary*, in order to prevent the contagion of French principles. They said, that they were aware that great sacrifices would be necessary; but, that it was better to sacrifice a part than the whole of our property and our religion into the bargain. They asserted, that France was in the *gulf of bankruptcy*; and, that if we expended much, she would be *totally ruined*.

The war began. France, instead of being conquered, became a conqueror. France, in the year 1797, had got rid of almost the whole of her debt, and her currency was *gold*, while, in that same year, the Bank of England obtained an Act of Parliament to enable it to refuse to pay its bills in money. Still the war raged, till, at last, in 1814, we saw the Bourbons actually replaced upon the throne of France.

This was the day of triumph with the system of Pitt! Now it was, that you were tauntingly reminded of your long opposition to the war. Now it was, that you were called upon to confess your error, and to go and perform "*an act of penitence at the foot of the statue of Pitt*." You were better employed. You were fox-hunting, I believe. In the mean while the nation was drunk with joy. Bonfires, bell-ringing, roasting oxen, illuminations, sham-fights, temples of victory, triumphal arches. The country resounded with the boast of our having *gloriously triumphed at last*; of our long perseverance having been *rewarded by a glorious result*.

But, it did not require the return of Napoleon to make the nation feel, that all this boasting was without reason, and that, while the recent events had afforded ground for transient exultation, the perseverance in the war had loaded us with lasting calamities. It did not require the return of Napoleon to convince us of this. The people had been buoyed up with the hope, that PEACE would bring them ease from the burdens which they had so long been compelled to bear. But, they soon discovered, that, *even with the Bourbons on the throne of France*, the taxes in Eng-

land could not be reduced without leaving the government to make loans in time of peace. The war had, to outward appearance, been crowned with success. The Bourbons, the Pope, the Inquisition had been restored, and "*French principles*" had been extinguished. But, in the obtaining of this success, the nation had incurred an *additional debt*, the interest of which demanded 31 millions of pounds sterling to be raised in taxes every year *for ever*, which, with the 9 millions of taxes annually required before 1793, made 40 millions a year for ever to be raised in taxes. It was soon discovered, that the *reward* which long perseverance in the war was to receive, was never to be received. The nation, no longer amused and buoyed up by the events of war, and the hopes of its final success, began to cry out for *relief* from its burdens. Those who were able to escape from their share of these burdens, sought relief by going to live in France. The land became unable to pay the taxes, necessary to discharge the interest of the debt and to keep up the army, navy, and other establishments. A law was passed to keep out French produce, in order to enable the land in England to pay its taxes. The people cried aloud against such a measure, at a moment when they expected *cheapness* to return, and when trade, commerce, and manufactures were visibly on the decline. A shock was felt from one end of the kingdom to the other. All was now manifestly out of joint; and the government appeared to be more embarrassed than at any period of the war, not excepting even that when the Bank stopped paying its notes in money.

This was the situation of England when Napoleon returned to France. Therefore, in estimating the *Pitt system*, I have no need, unless I choose, to take into view this wonderful event; for, it seems to me, that that system would have produced all the evils that you foreboded, *if this event had never taken place*. This system had, indeed, replaced the Bourbons on the throne, contrary to your expectations and your hopes; but, it had, in doing that, destroyed the prosperity and happiness of England. It had, it was supposed, extinguished "*French principles*;" but, in order to do that, it had made paupers of, perhaps, a million of our people; and it had laid its hands on a great part of the



property and the earnings of the rest of the community. It had closed the contest by making it the interest of English people of fortune to go and live upon that fortune in France, in order to be more at their ease, and to enjoy greater happiness than they could, with the same means, enjoy at home. These were the *permanent effects* which the Pitt system had produced, *before* the return of Napoleon; and, I believe, that few men of any knowledge as to these matters, will be found to say, that we should have been able, *without some very great change at home*, to have gone on for any length of time in peace. It is notorious, that the distresses of the country were never so great as during the last twelve months. That the merchant, the manufacturer, the shop-keeper, the artisan, never experienced so great a degree of distress; and, we have recently heard it declared in the House of Commons, that the *County Jails* are now crowded with the *Cultivators of the Land*. This is what was *never before* known in England. It is a new, and the most conclusive proof, of national distress.

While England was in this state, France afforded to all who went thither, proofs of great internal prosperity. Her agriculture was pouring its super-abundance upon us, and was producing that cheapness which our people wanted, which the necessities of the government could not allow it to permit them to have. The land in France, comparatively, little burdened, was sending forth its products to cause cheapness here, and to carry back the means of fructification in its own bosom. The French loaf was driving our own out of the market, and compelling our government either to exclude it from our country, or to abstain from taking from the land in England the means of paying the interest of the debt, *occasioned by that war*, which had terminated in re-placing the Bourbons on the throne of France, and, as was thought, in extinguishing "*French principles*."

It was manifest to all men, capable of reasoning upon such subjects, that the result, if peace had continued, even with the Bourbons in France, would have been the most deplorable distress in England. It was manifest, that a large part of the rents of land, and of the dividends on stock, would have been drawn from England and expended in France; that the *undiminished* taxes would have fallen wholly

upon those persons who remained, and whose means of paying taxes would have been *diminished daily*; that the demand for labour, in all branches, would have decreased; that the nation would have become more and more languid and feeble; and this, too, while the means of France, from the migration of English of all sorts, not excepting the ablest of manufacturers, would have increased in a like proportion; and while America, our war with whom was the natural consequences of, and, indeed, made a part of, the *Pitt system*, had established manufactories to a great extent, and was coming forth, fresh, vigorous, elated, full of reputation, of hope, and of means, to enter upon a rivalry with us, not only in maritime commerce, but also in naval power.

Such was the result; such were the effects of the *Pitt system*, even as things stood previous to Napoleon's departure from Elba. Such were the effects, upon the supposition that "*French principles*" had really been extinguished in Europe. If any one deny the facts which I have stated, he will, of course, reject the conclusion at which I have been aiming; but if no one can deny these facts, no one can deny, that the Pitt system has been the most fatal that England ever saw; and that, even while the Bourbons were on the throne of France, you were justified in maintaining, that your opposition to the war had been, by the result, proved to have been founded in wisdom: not only in justice and a love of freedom, but in sound policy, having in view solely the prosperity and power of England.

But it may be said, and by some persons it will be said, that though the fact be incontestibly proved, that England has lost greatly by the war against France; though it be proved, that even with the Bourbons on the throne, her prosperity was sapped, her force greatly impaired, her people plunged in distress, and her financial overthrow clearly approaching: though all this be proved, she had *by war avoided a revolution*. If by revolution is meant *a reform in Parliament*, I agree to the assertion. But I will not, at present, contend upon this head. Granted, that we must have had *a revolution*, in the Pitt sense of the word, if we had not had war. And what then? Why, if we had had a revolution, we should, at any rate, not have been *worse off* than the people of

France; and, as we now see, the people of France are better off than they were before the revolution; and, as is agreed on all hands, I think, better off than we now are. This is proved, not by what travellers say only, but by the notorious fact, that hundreds and thousands of families went from England to live in France; and (oh! deep disgrace to the Pitt system!) by the petitions of the English Landholders themselves, who, amongst their grounds for demanding a Corn Bill, stated, with perfect truth, that they were unable to contend with the French corn-growers, because these latter were *so lightly taxed in comparison with us*, and because they were *relieved from tythes*. If, then, the French nation has *gained* thus by their revolution, what reason have we to say, that we have, in *avoiding a revolution*, received *a compensation* for all the distresses heaped on us by a war carried on to keep off such a revolution?

The sum of our *success*, then, even in February last, when the Bourbons were upon the throne, was, in its utmost extent, that we had preserved the *Church property*, the *Feudal Rights and Titles*, and the *Borough system*. This is the most that the Pitt system can take credit for. But, I now proceed to shew, that, even supposing it to have been most desirable to preserve all these by the extinguishment of "*French principles*," this was *not accomplished*, even if the Bourbons had *remained* upon the throne. The return of Napoleon has not *created anew* the French principles; it has not even *revived* those principles; it has only proved to the world, that those principles had never, for a moment, ceased to be in a state of activity.

What were these dreaded French principles? That the people ought to be taxed only by their *real representatives*; that there ought to be no *predominant church*; that the people have a right to possess the property *formerly belonging to the offending Noblesse and to the whole of the Church*; that the King, or chief Magistrate, has no right to rule *except by the will of the people*. And, with the exception of a little shuffle as to the last, more in the form than the substance, did not the Bourbons solemnly agree to reign according to these principles? This is so notorious, that no one will venture to deny it; and, what is equally notorious,

and far more important, is, that it was by endeavouring to subvert these principles, that the Bourbons, in a very few months, lost their throne. It is clear, therefore, that even with the Bourbons on the throne of France, we had not been able to extinguish French principles; nay, even at that time, such was the force of the *example*, that our own Landholders began openly to express feelings of *envy* at seeing their neighbours relieved from the burden of *tythes*, the ridding the country of which was one of the greatest, if not the very greatest, achievement of the French revolution. It was, really, a thing to admire: to hear the gentlemen, who had for so many years, been haranguing and marshalling their tenantry against the *sacreligious* principles of the French, telling the Parliament very gravely, that the French were better off than themselves because they had got rid of *tythes*; and, in that word, as you will clearly perceive, is included the Bishops' revenues and the whole of the Church Establishment.

Now, then, in coming towards the *prospect before us*, if the Pitt system had accomplished no one of the objects it contemplated, even supposing the Bourbons to have remained on the throne of France, what hope is there in continuing that same system? It would be very wonderful indeed, if we were by war to succeed in overthrowing Napoleon a second time; but, if he were to die a natural death; to be killed in battle; or, to be assassinated; what *end* would that answer? Is it to be believed, that amongst the Carnots, the Marats, the Fouches, the Caulincourts, and hundreds of others; men capable of writing such papers as we have recently seen from their pens, and which papers put to shame that poverty of talent which we see opposed to them: is it to be believed, that, amongst all these famous men, none would be to be found to carry on the government and to direct its forces, in case Napoleon should lose his life? If, during the heat of the revolution, we saw assembly after assembly dissolved; committee succeed committee; changes in the chiefs; the rise of one faction over another; and still the French armies always faithful to their colours and their country. If we saw this, during so many years of internal commotion and foreign war; amidst all the turmoil of paper money, confiscation, and sometimes famine, what



reason have we to suppose, that the safety of France and the support of her principles depend now solely upon the life of one man? the greatest man, I allow; great beyond any man that France, or the world, ever before saw. But, I am not disposed to pay him the hyperbolical compliment to admit the supposition, that the safety and freedom of the French nation hang upon his single life,

What, then, will the Pitt system have done for us, even if it should succeed in destroying the life of this wonderful man? The idea, that a nation like England should bear to be told, that its well-being requires the death of a foreign sovereign, is truly disgraceful to the human character. But, as to the fact, how could such an event tend to relieve from their fears those who are so anxious to see "*French principles*" extinguished?

It is impossible to say who might succeed Napoleon as the head of the government; or what form, or title, the executive part of that government might assume. But, if the Chief were called Emperor, King, Consul, or President, what doubt can there be, that the basis of his authority would be the same, that the nature of the government would undergo little change, that the rights and property of the people would remain unshaken? And, if this were the case, nothing would have been gained by war, even in the way of extinguishing "*French principles*." Nay, the matter would be still worse; for, in all human probability, much of the imperial style, now preserved in gratitude to Napoleon, would be withdrawn, and the haters of French principles would have, staring them full in the face, a *Republic* in name, as the French nation now is in principle and essence.

But, the Pitt system proposes, perhaps, and fully expects, to place the Bourbons again upon the throne. It must do this, or, as we have seen, it does worse than nothing at all. It presumes, that it shall be able to do it, *because it has done it before*. But, this is an argument with two edges; for we may say, if you can put up the Bourbons, because you have done it once before, the French nation can drive them out again, *because they have done it twice before*. To prevent this, some of our impudent and foolish writers have openly said, that, "when we have restored the Bourbons again, we must not only

"take care, that they have proper Ministers, but we must compel them to adopt strong measures of government; and we shall have a right so to do, because our own safety and the safety of Europe demand it." So that this war (for it has been going on from the year 1792) which was begun on the alleged ground of the provocation which the Convention had given in a decree for offering assistance to oppressed foreign nations, is, according to these writers, to be wound up by our not only dictating a ruler to France, but in our appointing the ministers of that ruler, and in dictating measures to those ministers! This differs, indeed, very widely from what LALLY TOLENDAL and CHATEAUBRIAND are telling the French people from "the King's Council Chamber" at GHENT. They say: "above all, remember, that the rebellion once put down, the Usurper once destroyed, no foreign power will place itself between the legitimate Prince and his faithful people, to interfere with any of the political institutions, of which the proposal, the consideration, and the adoption, will belong exclusively to them." Our Times newspaper has asserted the contrary; and, really, I think the editor of that paper a better authority than Lally Tolendal or the wild old scribe, Chateaubriand, who, I think they say, has been made a Viscount.

The war, we are now told, has begun. The dispatch of Lord Clancarty says, the Allies "ARE AT WAR," and all the world knows, that France has committed no act of hostility, while she still holds out the olive branch to all Europe. In the report of the Earl of Liverpool's speech, during the debate of last Monday night, he dropped, that the object of the war was "to destroy that SYSTEM," which was now existing in France. The TIMES newspaper of Tuesday last has this passage:—"La Vendee has risen! It may be recollected, that we not long ago noticed the sailing of a secret expedition, consisting of several ships of war. These ships sailed from Falmouth, and were destined to the coast of La Vendee, to supply the loyalists in that country with a quantity of arms of every description, in conformity with their earnest solicitations. According to advices received on Sunday by Government, the landing of the arms had been effected with great

“management and address, and they were  
 “received by the people with equal grati-  
 “tude. In the course of yesterday this  
 “important intelligence was confirmed,  
 “by the arrival of the *Cephalus* sloop of  
 “war at Portsmouth from the coast of  
 “France, which, according to a telegraphic  
 “message to the *Admiralty*, did not quit  
 “her station until it was known that the  
 “insurrection was general, the white  
 “cockade mounted, and the cause of  
 “Louis XVIII. every where proclaimed.  
 “Immense numbers trooped to the Royal  
 “standard. Report, though probably  
 “with some exaggeration, made them al-  
 “ready amount to 50,000. Among the  
 “leaders are the friends, the relatives,  
 “the avengers of those glorious men, who  
 “fell in the cause of their country in the  
 “field, on the scaffold, and in the dun-  
 “geon. There is the son of the truly  
 “great *Charette*: there are the associates  
 “of *Sombriuil*, and *Georges*, and *Frotte*.”

Thus, then, even before war has been declared, it is publicly announced, that we have sent arms to assist insurgents in France. How exactly the present state of things resembles the state of things in 1793 and 1794! The following is published, in the *TIMES* newspaper of 22d instant, as an extract of a Proclamation, issued at Petersburg on the 25th of April, addressed to the French people: “You entered my territories, unprovoked, with fire and sword, you plundered and destroyed wherever you came; you entered my capital, which you laid waste. I entered your territories, and took your capital, but destroyed nothing. Again, unprovoked, you raise the sword, and destroy the peace of nations. I will now enter your territories, once more, to conquer peace; and wherever I meet with resistance, I will UTTERLY DESTROY YOU FOR YOUR PER- FIDY.” Whether this be authentic or not, as such it has gone forth to the world, and, of course, to France. Louis, on his part, tells the French, that his only error was too much clemency; but there are times, when every thing may be pardoned but a perseverance in crimes. All this is so like the proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick, and the proclamations from Coblenz, that no one can pretend that it has the smallest pretensions to novelty. To wind up the whole, England has agreed

to pay subsidies to the invading continental armies.

This is the scene of 1793 returned: all the sovereigns of Europe combined against the French nation and its principles of government. That this is the true Pitt system no one will deny; and, we shall now see to what it will bring France, the rest of Europe, and ourselves. The preparations on both sides are enormous; all the means of destruction that Europe affords have been collected, or are collecting; all the treasures that Europe affords are ready to pour forth; all the hostile passions are roused. That we shall witness carnage most horrible I have not the least doubt; that we shall again hear of very rigorous proceedings in France is to be expected; popular vengeance will again, perhaps, surpass the bounds of ordinary justice; the bosom of that fine country may again be lacerated by her own children as well as by their enemies; but I do not believe, that, let what else will happen, the Bourbons will ever again be placed on the throne of France; I do not believe, that the French people will ever again submit to their sway.

I grant, that, if once entered into the war, the stimulus to exertion and perseverance, on the part of the coalition of Sovereigns, will be greater than ever it has before been; for, if they be now compelled to leave France with her principles, after a war of any duration, they must see that those principles will not be long in making their way over all Europe, even to its utmost bounds. They must see that this is the last war on the subject; the last agitation of the question. But, on the other hand, the French people must see that their fate depends upon their exertions and perseverance. They will all now be armed; the whole of that populous country will be in motion; already the old confederation appear to be reviving. If there be no neutrality allowed out of France, we may be assured, that none will be allowed in it. If the rich be disinclined to bestir themselves, the poor will take the riches along with the office of defending them. The men who now compose the government of France are not men to stop at the end of a part of their means. They will say, “France must be defended. Without new confiscations; without new seizures of the



"wealth of egotists; without new committees of surveillance; without new revolutionary tribunals; without a new deportation of priests and ex-nobles; without all, or any of these, if possible; but, at any rate, France must be defended." I lay little stress, therefore, on the accounts which are given us, of the respectable towns-people, the respectable proprietors, the respectable professional men, being for the King. These respectable people must march and fight, or their professions, as in the first war, will serve as a reward for those who will fight and who are without possessions.

Napoleon is very violently abused, in our newspapers, for having put 50,000 muskets into the hands of the artizans and labourers of the suburbs of Paris, who are compared to the inhabitants of Ragfair and St. Giles's. But, these writers tell us, very often, of men charged with crimes being sent by our magistrates to the fleet or the army, instead of being sent to prison as malefactors. If our country were invaded, would not the government accept of the offers of labourers and artizans? If the rich, in France, should (I do not believe they will) endeavour to remain neutral, is there any chance of our seeing them so remain with impunity? If there be one rich to five poor, and if he does not contribute the means to enable the five to act, himself setting the example, those means will, of course, be taken from him and given, in one shape or another, to the five poor. This was the principle upon which the French nation acted before; and, if necessity again puts this principle in practice, the consequences will naturally be the same as before.

If my view of the matter be, therefore, at all near the truth, it is not a holiday war, on which we are about to enter. Nor is it likely to be a very halcyon time with those, whom we say we have for our friends in France, and of whose punishment, if detected, it is impossible that we can have the face to complain. "A vigour beyond the law" was justified in England at a time when England was not invaded; when she had all Europe fighting on her side against France; when there was scarcely a possibility of an enemy setting foot on her shore. We cannot, therefore, be surprised, if Napo-

leon should resort to a similar vigour, under the circumstances that are now approaching. Our writers cry aloud against Napoleon's resorting to the levy of a million, or two, of National Guards. They call this a horrible tyranny. To be sure, because it is formidable to his enemies, who seek his destruction. CHATEAUBRIAND, from the "Council Chamber" at Ghent, talks of the danger of this disastrous conscription. Well he may. But he says, that, luckily, the invasion of France, last year, destroyed several manufactories of arms. Courage! Monsieur le Viscomte de Chateaubriand! Armless as they will be, you would not, I imagine, care to face any one of them, even with Lally Tolendal at your back. This calling out of the National Guard, Monsieur le Viscomte calls an "immense haul; a general proscription; an extermination of the French people at a blow; a frightful and monstrous thing."

Turning from this sorry bombast, this ridiculous trash, we may I think, look upon it as certain, that to keep the Bourbons upon the throne of France, if once placed there, would require foreign soldiers stationed in every city, town, village and hamlet, unless those Bourbons governed upon the present principles. To conquer, in such a way, such a nation as France, is impossible. Language does not contain the words to describe the means of effecting such subjugation. All the hired troops in all Europe would not take from the people of France their lands, or make them pay tythes, or submit to feudal rights and laws. And yet, if this be not done, "French principles" remain, and the Pitt system has accomplished nothing but the distress and degradation of England and the creation of an American navy.

Thus, Sir, I think, I have shewn, that that system, which is still called the Pitt system, has completely failed in all that it professed to have in view, and that it is in a fair way of completely succeeding in destroying all that has supported it. But, I must not conclude without clearly protesting against being understood to ascribe this system exclusively to one of the two political parties who have so long been striving against each other for the possession of power. The party who are now out of place, did, when they were in place, pursue precisely the same system.

Indeed, they defended their measures by asserting that they were *consonant to the principles and system of Pitt*, and that he would have done the same under like circumstances. This the other party used to deny. Both parties pretended that they were, and still pretend that they are, the followers of Pitt. "*Ours is his system,*" say one party. "No," say the other, "*it is we who possess his true system.*" Like the two convents of monks, who, in their holy zeal, blackguarded each other for four centuries, each of them swearing that they possessed exclusively the real cross on which Christ was crucified. A mutual friend to these ghostly brotherhoods, at one time, interfered, recommending a *miracle* to make *both* real crosses. But this did not suit the brotherhood whose cross happened to be in vogue, as they would thereby have let their rivals in for a share of the offerings.

No miracle is, however, necessary in the case before us. The people of England, long ago cured of party delusions; long ago sickened by the professions of hunters after place; long ago disgusted with the wrangling of the OUTS and the INS, whom they have constantly seen unite and cordially co-operate against reform; the people are quite willing to give them *both* credit for possessing the *real Pitt system*, and to believe, that, if those who are now OUTS were INS, they would do precisely that which is now doing, and that which will be done, by their opponents.

I am, Sir, with great respect,  
your faithful and obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

#### AMERICA AND ALGIERS.

As the war, which has now begun between the "*Democratic Rulers*" of America and the "*Regular Government*" of Algiers, may lead to important consequences, it is proper to insert here the grounds of this war, as far as we can come at them. We have the American official documents only. America has a tell-tale sort of government. It has no state secrets. It blabs out the proceedings in negotiations, while the negotiators are still assembled. Not so the Regular Government of Algiers, which is one of the "*ancient and venerable institutions*" which the Bostonian Noblesse so much admire; one of the "*gems in the crown of ancient glory,*"

of which Mr. Chateaubriand speaks so feelingly and so foolishly; one of the *links* in the *chain* of the "*social system,*" which has recently been under the hammers of so many able artizans at Vienna. The Regular Government of Algiers does not make any *prefaces* to war. It observes a dignified silence *till it has actually begun and made some progress in the war!* Till it has made a good haul of the enemy's ships, before he knows that he is looked upon as an enemy. This is the practice of the Regular Government; the "*ancient and venerable institution, in Algiers.*" I shall now insert, first, an account of the grounds of war from the *National Intelligencer*, published at Washington; next the Report of Congress upon the subject; and last, the *Act of Congress* declaring war against Algiers. For, the reader will observe, that, in the Irregular Government of America, war cannot be declared by the Chief Magistrate, without the consent of the people's *real* representatives.—I reserve a few remarks to follow the documents.

#### Grounds of the War.—From the National Intelligencer.

It is probable that many of our readers may not bear in mind the facts on which the recent Declaration of War against Algiers is predicated. We have, therefore, obtained for their information, the Report made on the subject by Mr. Gaston, of the House of Representatives, chairman of the committee, to whom the bill was re-committed in secret sitting.—The documents accompanying the Report, which are too long, and perhaps not proper, for present publication, are so conclusive, as to leave no doubt on the mind of any one who hears or reads them, of the impossibility of re-establishing Peace with the Dey of Algiers, unless by coercion, except under the most base and humiliating condition. Our readers may judge of the inveterate hostility of that barbarian tyrant towards us, growing merely out of the most sordid cupidity and natural ferocity and cruelty of temper, by two or three facts, collected from a momentary glance at the documents accompanying the Report of the committee.—A person was entrusted, as from the American merchants in Spain, with the task of endeavouring to procure the liberation of the eleven or twelve of our citizens captive in



Algiers, for whom he was authorised to give a ransom, not exceeding 3000 dollars per man. To every attempt of this kind, the Dey replied, "that not for two millions of dollars would he sell his American slaves!" — In reply to an application, in the most confidential manner, to one of the Dey's ministers, to know the terms which the Dey expected to extort from the United States (by keeping our citizens slaves) in the event of a treaty with them, it appears, that "it was a settled point with the Dey, from which he could by no means swerve, that in the first place, for the privilege of passing the straits of Gibraltar, two millions of dollars would be required of the American Government, and THEN the stipulations of the late treaty might be renewed (the old tributary treaty) after paying up all arrears of tribute," &c. &c.

#### THE REPORT.

The committee to whom has been referred the bill "for the protection of the United States against the Algerine cruizers," with instructions to enquire and report in detail the facts upon which the measure contemplated is predicated, report— That in the month of July, 1812, the Dey of Algiers, taking offence, or pretending to take offence, at the quality and quantity of a shipment of military stores made by the United States, in pursuance of the stipulation in the Treaty of 1795, and refusing to receive the stores, extorted from the American Consul General at Algiers, by threats of personal imprisonment, and of reducing to slavery all Americans in his power, a sum of money claimed as the arrearages of Treaty stipulations, and denied by the United States to be due; and then compelled the Consul, and all citizens of the United States at Algiers, abruptly to quit his dominions. — It further appears to the committee, that on the 25th of August following, the American brig *Edwin* of Salem, owned by Nathaniel Silsbee of that place, while on a voyage from Malta to Gibraltar, was taken by an Algerine Corsair, and carried into Algiers as prize. The commander of the brig, Captain George Campbell Smith, and the crew, ten in number, have ever since been detained in captivity, with the exception of two of them, whose release has been effected under circumstances not indicating any change of hostile temper on the part of the Dey. It also appears, that a vessel, sailing under the Spanish flag has been condemned in Algiers, as laying a false claim to that flag,

and concealing her true American character. In this vessel was taken a Mr. Pollard, who claims to be an American citizen, and is believed to be of Norfolk, Virginia, and who, as an American citizen, is kept in captivity. The government, justly solicitous to relieve these unfortunate captives, caused an agent, (whose connection with the government was not disclosed) to be sent to Algiers, with the means and with instructions to effect their ransom, if it could be done at a price not exceeding three thousand dollars per man. The effort did not succeed, because of the Dey's avowed policy to increase the number of his American slaves, in order to be able to compel a renewal of his treaty with the United States, on terms suited to his rapacity. Captain Smith, Mr. Pollard, and the Master of the *Edwin*, are not confined, nor kept at hard labour; but the rest of the captives are subjected to the well-known horrors of Algerine slavery. The Committee have not been apprised of any other specific outrages upon the persons or property of American citizens besides those stated; and they apprehend, that the fewness of these is attributable to the want of opportunity and not of inclination in the Dey, to prey upon our commerce, and to enslave our citizens. The war with Britain has hitherto shut the Mediterranean against American vessels, which, it may be presumed will now shortly venture upon it. The committee are all of opinion, upon the evidence which has been laid before them, that the Dey of Algiers considers his treaty with the United States as at an end, and is waging war against them. The evidence upon which this is founded, and from which are extracted the facts above stated, accompanies this report, and with it is respectfully submitted—

#### AN ACT

For the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine cruizers.

WHEREAS, the Dey of Algiers, on the coast of Barbary, has commenced a predatory warfare against the United States—

*BE it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That it shall be lawful fully to equip, officer, man and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas.

*Sect. 2. And be it further enacted,* That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to instruct the commanders of the respective

public vessels aforesaid, to subdue, seize, and make prize of all vessels, goods, and effects, of or belonging to the Dey of Algiers, or to his subjects, and to bring or send the same into port, to be proceeded against and distributed according to law; and also, to cause to be done, all such other acts of precaution or hostility, as the state of war will justify, and may in his opinion require.

Sec. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That on the application of the owners of private armed vessels of the United States, the President of the United States may grant them special commissions, in the form which he shall direct under the seal of the United States; and such private armed vessels, when so commissioned, shall have the like authority for subduing, seizing, taking, and bringing into port any Algerine vessels, goods or effects, as the above-mentioned public armed vessels may by law have; and shall therein be subject to the instructions which may be given by the President of the United States, for the regulation of their conduct, and their commissions shall be revocable at his pleasure: Provided, That before any commission shall be granted as aforesaid, the owner or owners of the vessel for which the same may be requested, and the commander thereof for the time being, shall give bond to the United States, with at least two responsible sureties, not interested in such vessels, in the penal sum of seven thousand dollars, or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, in the penal sum of fourteen thousand dollars, with condition for observing the treaties and laws of the United States, and the instructions which may be given as aforesaid, and also for satisfying all damages and injuries which shall be done contrary to the tenor thereof, by such commissioned vessel, and for delivering up the commission when revoked by the President of the United States.

Sec. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That any Algerine vessel, goods or effects, which may be so captured and brought into port, by any private armed vessel of the United States, duly commissioned as aforesaid, may be adjudged good prize, and thereupon shall accrue to the owners, and officers, and men of the capturing vessel, and shall be distributed according to the agreement which shall have been made between them; or, in failure of such agreement, according to the discretion of the court having cognizance of the capture.

There is one circumstance connected with this Algerine war, which I think worthy of *particular notice*; and that is, this regular government began, it appears, its depredations on the Americans, just as

these latter were entering upon war with US! some of our modest and honest gentlemen; some of our most *honourable* men, have called America an *assassin*, because she made war against us, while we were at war with Napoleon. What will they say now of the venerable head of this African state? The same *honourable* worthies have said, that because America went to war with us, while we had to fight Napoleon, she was the *slave* of Napoleon. But I hope they will not apply this reasoning to the present war between America and Algiers: I fervently hope, that no one will pretend, that, because Algiers went to war with America while America had to fight us, Algiers was the *slave* of England!—As to the result of the war, I have no doubt, that the Dey will not have to rejoice much at the success of his undertaking. A dry blow instead of millions of dollars are likely to be his portion. As an Englishman, I must wish, that the Algerines may be beaten by those, who have, unfortunately, so often beaten my own countrymen.—The *Times* newspaper has told us, that it is *suspected*, that the Algerine war is, with America, a *PRETEXT* for *increasing her navy*. Indeed, Doctor! and, in what civilian have you discovered, that America is restrained from augmenting her navy at her *pleasure*? What need has she of *pretexts*? I know, indeed, that, amongst your other follies, you did, during last summer, insist upon it, that, in making peace with America, she should, at last, be compelled to *stipulate not to have any ships of war beyond a certain size and number*. But, the stipulation was not obtained; and now, instead of big menaces, you throw out your *suspectings* for the cogitations of the wise John Bull.—Away driveller! and await a similar fate to your predictions as to the humiliations of France.

#### OVERTURES OF PEACE FROM THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

LETTER FROM M. CAULAINCOURT TO VISCOUNT  
CASTLEREAGH, DATED PARIS, 4th APRIL,  
1815,

My Lord—The Emperor was anxious to express directly to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent the sentiments which inspire him, and to make known to him the high value which he places on the maintenance of the peace happily existing between the two countries. I am commanded in consequence, my Lord, to address to



on the annexed letter, and to beg your Excellency to present it to his Royal Highness—The first wish of the Emperor being, that the repose of Europe should remain inviolate, his Majesty has been anxious to manifest this disposition to the Sovereigns who are still assembled at Vienna, and to all other Sovereigns. I have, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, Duc de Vicence.

LETTER FROM M. DE CAULAINCOURT TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH, DATED PARIS, APRIL 4, 1815.

My Lord—The expectations which induced his Majesty the Emperor, my August Sovereign, to submit to the greatest sacrifices, have not been fulfilled: France has not received the price of the devotion of its Monarch: her hopes have been lamentably deceived. After some months of painful restraint, her sentiments, concealed with regret, have at length manifested themselves in an extraordinary manner: by an universal and spontaneous impulse, she has declared as her deliverer, the man, from whom alone she can expect the guarantee of her liberties and independence. The Emperor has appeared, the Royal Throne has fallen, and the Bourbon family have quitted our territory, without one drop of blood having been shed for their defence. Borne upon the arms of his people, his Majesty has traversed France, from the point of the coast at which he at first touched the ground, as far as the centre of his capital, to that residence which is now again, as are all French hearts, filled with our dearest remembrances. No obstacles have delayed his Majesty's triumphal progress; from the instant of his re-landing upon French ground, he resumed the government of his empire. Scarcely does his first reign appear to have been for an instant interrupted. Every generous passion, every liberal thought, has rallied around him; never did any nation present a spectacle of more awful unanimity. The report of this great event will have reached your Lordship. I am commanded to announce it to you, in the name of the Emperor, and to request you will convey this declaration to the knowledge of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, your August Master. This Restoration of the Emperor to the Throne of France is for him the most brilliant of his triumphs. His Majesty prides himself above all, on the reflection, that he owes it entirely to the love of the French people, and he has no other wish than to repay such affections no longer by the trophies of vain ambition, but by all the advantages of an honourable repose, and by all the blessings of a happy tranquillity. It is to the duration of peace that the Emperor looks forward for the accom-

plishment of his noblest intentions. With a disposition to respect the rights of other nations, his Majesty has the pleasing hope, that those of the French nation will remain inviolate. The maintenance of this precious deposit is the first, as it is the dearest of his duties. The quiet of the world is for a long time assured, if all the other Sovereigns are disposed, as his Majesty is, to make their honour consist in the preservation of peace, by placing peace under the safeguard of honour. Such are, my Lord, the sentiments with which his Majesty is sincerely animated, and which he has commanded me to make known to your Government. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicence.  
His Excellency Lord Castlereagh, &c.

LETTER FROM VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO M. CAULAINCOURT, DATED, DOWNING-STREET, APRIL 8, 1815.

SIR—I have been honoured with two letters from your excellency bearing date the 4th inst. from Paris, one of them covering a letter addressed to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent. I am to acquaint your Excellency, that the Prince Regent has declined receiving the letter addressed by your Excellency to me, to Vienna, for the information and consideration of the Allied Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries there assembled.

I am, &c. CASTLEREAGH.

VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH TO THE EARL OF CLANCARTY, DATED FOREIGN OFFICE, 8TH APRIL, 1815.

MY LORD—I herewith inclose a copy of an Overture this day received from M. de Caulaincourt, with the answer returned. You will communicate the same to the Allied Sovereigns and Plenipotentiaries at Vienna, for their information. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) CASTLEREAGH.  
Earl of Clancarty, &c.

THE EARL OF CLANCARTY TO VISCOUNT CASTLEREAGH, DATED VIENNA, MAY 6, 1815.

MY LORD—Adverting to your Lordship's dispatch, No. 3, and to its several inclosures, conveying a proposal made by the existing Government in France, and your Lordship's answer thereto, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Majesty's Government, that at a conference held on the 3d inst. his Highness Prince Metternich acquainted us, that a M. de Strassant, who had been stopped on his way hither, at Lintz, from not having been furnished with proper passports, had addressed a letter to his Imperial Majesty, and therewith forwarded

some unopened letters which the Emperor had directed him to unseal in the presence of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers. These proved to be a letter from Bonaparte, addressed to his Majesty, professing a desire to continue at peace, to observe the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, &c. and a letter from M. de Caulaincourt to Prince Metternich, containing similar professions. After reading these Papers, it was considered whether any, and what answer should be made thereto, when the general opinion appeared to be, that none should be returned, and no notice whatever taken of the proposal. Upon this, as indeed upon all other occasions subsequent to the resumption of authority by Bonaparte, wherein the present state of the Continental Powers, with regard to France, has come under discussion, but one opinion has appeared to direct the Councils of the several Sovereigns. They adhere, and from the commencement have never ceased to adhere, to their Declaration of the 13th of March, with respect to the actual Ruler of France. They are in a state of hostility with him and his adherents, not from choice, but from necessity, because past experience has shewn, that no faith has been kept by him, and that no reliance can be placed on the professions of one who has hitherto no longer regarded the most solemn compacts than as it may have suited his own convenience to observe them, whose word, the only assurance he can afford for his peaceable disposition, is not less in direct opposition to the tenor of his former life, than it is to the military position in which he is actually placed. They feel that they should neither perform their duty to themselves or to the people committed by Providence to their charge, if they were now to listen to those professions of a desire for peace which have been made, and suffer themselves thus to be lulled into the supposition that they might now relieve their people from the burthen of supporting immense military masses, by diminishing their forces to a peace establishment, convinced as the several Sovereigns are from past experience, that no sooner should they have been disarmed, than advantage would be taken of their want of preparation, to renew those scenes of aggression and bloodshed, from which they had hoped that the peace so gloriously won at Paris, would long have secured them. They are at war, then, for the purpose of obtaining some security for their own independence, and for the re-conquest of that peace and permanent tranquillity, for which the world has so long panted. They are not even at war for the greater or less portion of security which France can afford them of future tranquillity, but because France, under its present chief, is unable to afford them any security whatever. In this war, they do not desire to interfere with any legitimate right of the French people; they have no design to oppose the claim of that nation to choose their own form of Government, or intention to trench, in any respect, upon their independence as a great and free people: but they do think they have a right, and that of the highest nature, to contend against the re-establishment of an individual as the head of the French Government, whose past conduct has invariably demonstrated, that in such a situation he will not suffer other nations to be at peace—whose restless ambition, whose thirst for foreign conquest, and whose disregard for the rights and independence of other States, must expose the whole of Europe to renewed scenes of plunder and devastation. However general the feelings of the Sovereigns may be in favour of the restoration of the King, they no otherwise seek to influence the proceedings of the French in the choice of this or of any other dynasty, or form of Government, than may be essential to the safety and permanent tranquillity of the rest of Europe; such reasonable security being afforded by France in this respect, as other States have a legitimate right to claim in their own defence, their object will be satisfied; and they shall joyfully return to that state of peace, which will then, and then only, be open to them, and lay down those arms which they have only taken up for the purpose of acquiring that tranquillity so eagerly desired by them on the part of their respective Empires.—Such, my Lord, are the general sentiments of the Sovereigns and of their Ministers here assembled; and it should seem, that the glorious forbearance observed by them, when masters of the French capital in the early part of the last year, ought to prove to the French, that this is not a war against their freedom and independence, or excited by any spirit of ambition, or desire of conquest, but one arising out of necessity, urged on the principles of self-preservation, and founded on that legitimate and incontrovertible right of obtaining reasonable security for their own tranquillity and independence—to which, if France has on her part a claim, other nations have an equal title to claim at the hands of France. I this day laid before the Plenipotentiaries of the Three Allied Powers in conference, the Note proposed to be delivered upon the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of the 25th March. After the opinions which I have detailed as those with which the Allied Sovereigns are impressed, with respect to the object of the war, it is scarcely necessary for me to add, that the explanation afforded in this Note, as the construction put by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent on the eighth article of that Treaty, was favourably received. Immediate instructions will consequently be issued to the Ambassadors of the Imperial Courts of Austria and Russia, and to the Minister of his Prussian Majesty, to accept of this Note on the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty in question. In order to be assured that I have advanced nothing in this dispatch, which does not accord with the views of the Cabinets of the Allied Sovereigns, I have acquainted the Plenipotentiaries of the high Allied Powers with the contents thereof, and have the honour to inform you, that the sentiments contained in it entirely coincide with those of their respective Courts. I have the honour to be &c.

(Signed)

CLANCARTY.